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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARRIE M. CARTER, / 
Plaintiff and / 
Appellant, / 
vs. / Case No. 14516 
RAYMOND D. KINGSFORD and / 
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE / 
COMPANY, / 
Defendants and / 
Respondents. / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the appellant, the 
plaintiff in the Lower Court, against the respondents to 
set aside a release of liability entered into between appell-
ant and a representative of respondent, Transnational Insur-
ance Company, and to recover damages resulting from an auto-
mobile accident with respondent, Kingsford. Appellant alleges 
the release should be set aside on the grounds that a mutual 
mistake of fact induced its execution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was driving her automobile westbound on 
24th street approaching the intersection with Orchard Avenue 
in Ogden on April 26, 19 71. The respondent, Raymond D. 
Kingsford, was driving eastbound on 24th Street, approaching 
the same intersection when he began making a left turn in 
front of the appellant when a collision occured, with re-
sulting injuries to the appellant and damage to her vehicle. 
(R-23). Following the accident, and until the execution of 
the release on July 14, 1971, appellant was under medical 
treatment of her family physician, David P. Jahsman, M.D. (R-28). 
On July 14, 19 71, after Dr. Jahsman informed appellant that all 
x-rays taken of her neck and shoulder were normal and she had 
no other injuries, (R-lll) appellant executed the release with 
Transnational Insurance Company without seeking advice of counsel 
(R-29) and received a settlement of $3,334.09. (R-135). 
Subsequently, in September of 19 72, appellant 
developed headaches and a numbness in her right arm which 
again required her to seek the aid of a physician. (R-112). 
Appellant was treated by Dr. Jahsman until November, 19 74, 
when a neurosurgical consultation with Dr. C. D. Van Hook 
for the first time showed appellant had suffered a cervical 
herniated disc. (R-14). In January 1975, a surgical inter-
vention was necessitated requiring fusion of C5-6, which Dr. 
Jahsman stated was proximately necessitated by reason of the 
accident of 1971. (R-121). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT, HAVING NO AWARENESS OF SERIOUS 
SPINAL INJURY, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BOUND BY A RELEASE OF 
LIABILITY. 
Dr. David P. Jahsman treated appellant for a 
"Cervical Contusion", or bruise to her neck, from the date 
of the accident until she was authorized to return to work 
(R-120). Appellant executed a release six (6) weeks after 
the accident only after being told by Dr. Jahsman she only 
had a neck strain, that all x-rays taken were normal, i.e., 
that she did not have any other medical problems (R-112). 
Dr. Jahsman's report is further indicative of this fact 
when he notes that there was no indication or reason for a 
prognosis of the need for possible surgical repair for 
plaintiffs injury (R-121). 
In granting respondents Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court concluded, without benefit of any testimony, that 
"There is no way of knowing exactly if appellant's discs 
were herniated during the accident..." (R-114). Additionally, 
the Court, after noting appellant was treated for a stiff 
neck, concluded this was synonomous with her having knowledge 
that she had a herniated disc (R-114). In Reynolds vs Merrill, 
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460 P2d 323, (1969) , plaintiff was injured when a car 
rear-ended the one he (plaintiff) was operating. The 
plaintiff was treated for bursitis for two and one half 
(2%) months prior to signing a general release of liability. 
Subsequently, plaintiff continued to suffer from reoccuring 
pains. After numerous inconclusive tests were given, 
plaintiff was finally referred to an orthopedic specialist 
and at that time the injury was finally diagnozed as a 
herniated disc which was subsequently fused. The trial 
court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing 
the complaint because of the release. In reversing that 
ruling, the court noted, at page 324: 
"The trial court believed that the plaintiff 
had lost all rights against the defendant by 
reason of the release given, and he entered a 
Summary Judgment dismissing the complaint. In 
doing so, he failed to distinguish between an 
unknown injury and unknown consequences of a 
known injury. The former can be the basis of 
a mutual mistake of fact, while the latter 
would be only a mistake of opinion." 
The case under current consideration is very 
similar to the Reynolds case. In both the Reynolds case 
and this one, plaintiffs were treated by family physicians 
who, after a limited period of time informed their patients 
they had nothing of a serious nature wrong with them. In 
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each case, this information from the treating physicians 
induced the signing of the releases. In each case, after 
the releases were signed, physical symptoms developed which 
finally led the original treating physician to refer the 
plaintiffs to orthopedic specialists. In each case, the 
specialists diagnosed herniated discs as the cause of the 
problems and spinal fusions were performed resulting in 
permanent partial disability. 
It is submitted that the main difference between 
the cases, is that in the present case the plaintiffs injury 
was diagnosed as a bruise to the neck, while in the Reynolds 
case, it was diagnosed as bursitis. This Court held that 
in Reynolds, at page 326: 
"In the instant case the plaintiff does not 
contend that he should have the release set 
aside if it is shown that he actually intended 
to settle for all injuries. He here is asking 
for a day in court to establish, if he can, 
that there was a mutual mistake of fact re-
garding the injury which actually was in exist-
ence but which was unknown to both him and 
the insurance adjuster." 
POINT II 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED TO RESPONDENT WHEN FACTS BEFORE THE COURT 
PRESENT TRIABLE ISSUES. 
The appellant submits to the Court that Motion 
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for Summary Judgment should not have been granted to the 
respondent. This Court in often stated positions on the 
granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment has reasoned 
itfs only where it is perfectly clear that there are no 
issues in the case, that Summary Judgment is proper. 
In Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Ut.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 
(1959), this Court stated at page 636: 
"Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
not intended to provide a substitute for 
the regular trial of cases in which there are 
disputed issues of fact upon which the out-
come of the litigation depends, and it should 
be invoked with caution to the end, that 
litigants may be afforded trial where there 
exists between them a bona fide dispute of 
material fact." 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Samms vs. 
Eccles, 11 Ut.2d. 289; 358 P.2d. 344: 
"That some claims may be spurious, should not 
compel those who administer justice to shut 
their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go 
without being brought to account. It is a 
function of Courts and Juries to determine 
whether claims are valid or false. This 
responsibility should not be shunned merely 
because the task may be difficult to perform." 
and finally, in Frederick May & Company, Inc. vs. Dunn, 
13 Ut.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266, (1962), this Court stated: 
"To sustain the Summary Judgment, the pleadings, 
evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, 
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viewed most favorably to the loser, must 
show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, and that the winner is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law. 
Such showing must preclude as a matter of 
law, all reasonable possibility that the 
loser would win if given a trial." 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the 
iiower court erred in granting respondents Motion for Summary 
Judgment in that there were questions of fact at issue basic 
to a final rendering of Judgment in this action. 
Appellant executed the release only after being 
informed by the treating physician that all x-rays were 
normal and that she only had a stiff neck and shoulder. 
Her belief that she had no other injuries induced her to 
execute the release without her knowledge of the herniated 
disc which was not discovered until an orthopedic specialist 
examined her. Questions of fact which should be determined 
at trial are whether the disc was herniated in the accident, 
or was a result of gradual degenerations and whether or not 
her knowledge that she had a bruised neck should be equated 
as knowledge on her part of a herniated disc. 
Appellant is asking for the opportunity of proving 
that at the time of signing the release she had a herniated 
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disc which neither she nor the insurance adjuster new about; 
that the herniated disc was an unknown injury and not a 
known injury with unknown consequences. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Z/&*^j£f^/&-, iS^u jJ^KEITH HENDERSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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